The Principle of "Judicial Sincerity"
by Micah Schwartzman, Fellow, Columbia University Society of Fellows; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law; D.Phil, University of Oxford.
A strong presumption against lying applies to most of our interactions with other people. The same presumption would seem to hold in the context of judicial decision-making. Since it is usually wrong to deceive others, judges should be truthful about the reasons for their opinions. At the very least, and barring exceptional circumstances, they should not knowingly make statements that they think are false or seriously misleading. Indeed, this principle seems so straightforward that it may be hard to believe that anyone seriously doubts it.
Despite its presumptive appeal, however, the idea that judges must adhere to a principle of sincerity is surprisingly controversial. Some judges and legal theorists reject the notion that judges must really believe what they say in their legal opinions. Although this view probably remains a minority position in the academy and on the bench, it has been advanced explicitly with increasing force in recent years.
last updated: 05/06/2007