In Colorado, there are a few pending or recently concluded cases regarding unauthorized practice of law.  One has been against Suzanne Shell (some of her pages are found in our document repository) and another against or concerning Linda Sanders (see People v. Sanders,  07-cv-00192 (D.Colo. 2007) and In re Sanders, S.Ct. 06-1492.  These cases raise interesting and sometimes novel issues.  Perhaps, the most intriguing aspect of these cases is the vigor by which the Attorney Regulation Counsel (a/k/a the Attorney Deregulation Council) pursues prosecution of these cases often only on a scintilla of evidence, whilst disregarding real and substantive infractions alleged under Rule 251.9 against practicing attorneys (see our OARC pages).

 

This month's article is a short excerpt from a dated book, David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (Princeton Univ. Press, 1988).

 

 

David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (Princeton Univ. Press, 1988), pp. 246-47

       Then there are the unauthorized practice of law regulations. In thirty-seven jurisdictions, it is a misdemeanor for a nonlawyer to practice law (and “practicing law” is construed to include a large number of activities that on the surface do not require legal training, such as assisting people in filling out do-it-yourself divorce forms); seven other jurisdictions have formalized the power of courts to cite unauthorized practitioners for contempt.[1] By restricting the practice of law to members of the bar, of course, a professional monopoly  is guaranteed and a higher-than-otherwise level of lawyers’ fees is maintained.  The situation is exacerbated because courts usually delegate to bar committees the power to investigate and initiate actions against unauthorized practitioners; this striking conflict of interest has resulted in some amazing cases of turf protection against rather innocent (cut-rate) interlopers.[2]

            In 1974, two law school deans wrote a report for the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee suggesting that deregulation would be a plausible way to reduce the costs of legal services;[3] but such schemes have been strenuously (and understandably) opposed by the bar.  The official reason for unauthorized practice regulations is to protect consumers from the legal equivalent of Laetrile and orgone boxes. But Rhode’s survey of unauthorized practice enforcement showed that in 1979, only 2 percent of all inquiries, investigations, and complaints about unauthorized practice originated from consumers and involved specific consumer injury; and, of these, 19 percent concerned laymen pretending to be attorneys.  In fact, only twenty-two incidents out of 1188 concerned consumer complaints about unauthorized alternatives to lawyers (as opposed to phony lawyers).[4] Of course, it could be argued that this low figure is the result of the deterrent effect of the unauthorized practice regulations currently in place; but, since 1166 bar-initiated actions were reported, such an argument would be hard to make out, because the deterrent does not seem to be generally effective.  The clear conclusion is that unauthorized practice regulations ―state actions― prop up legal fees without serving any other significant public interest.

 

[1] Rhode (3), p. 11

[2] See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, Florida Bar v. American Business and Legal Forms, Inc., and Florida Bar v. Furman. The Furman case was the subject of a 60 Minutes episode, and is discussed in Kern.

[3] Ehrlich and Schwartz.

[4] Rhode (3), pp. 33-34

 


last updated: 06/01/2007