Comprehending Judicial Behavioral Pathology


working draft by Sean L. Harrington
suggested citation: Harrington, S.L. (Apr 2008) Comprehending judicial behavioral pathology. Retrieved insert date, http://www.knowyourcourts.com/featured_article.htm


Introduction

Judges are human and, so, we are told, "for criminal conduct, presumably, they can be punished like other people (Volcansek, 1996, p. 1)." Moreover, "there is ordinarily a more exacting standard of behavior expected of judges because of the power they can exert over liberty and property." Id. Yet, although the temptations to abuse such power is almost unparalleled in other professions, insurmountable obstacles have been erected against the detection of judicial misconduct and the effective and necessary removal of those judges, who have proven unable to wield judicial power with integrity. "Removal or discipline of judges is generally neglected in discussions of selection mechanisms and certainly in writings about democracy and democratization" (Volcansek, p.2). Generally, judges are only willing to discuss judicial reform proposals only after a deep crisis has threatened their jobs (Buscaglia, 2001). A recent example is the Breyer Report, in response to pressure from the U.S. Congress about the lack of accountability. Unfortunately, "Not only is there no effective mechanism for punishing a judge who yields to . . . temptations; that he has yielded can in most cases not even be detected" (Posner, 2005). Given this license, the following questions aren't difficult to answer:
Why would a 60-year-old federal judge of purported superior intellect unlawfully park in a disabled parking space of a drug store, then respond to the objections of a woman confined to a wheelchair by flashing his badge, identifying himself as a federal judge and threatening to have her removed by U.S. Marshalls?

Why would an august federal judge, who is a past chairman of a technology committee, use a government computer in chambers to download and view pornography from an adult swingers' Web site?

What might motivate a once-respected federal judge to make a gratuitous and impertinent remark about an acrobatic sexual position during a criminal trial?

Why would a federal judge, shortly after being commissioned, stop the proceedings during trial to obtain the identity of a striking woman, who had just entered the courtroom to take a seat in the gallery?
All of these are among several allegations that have been lodged against Edward W. Nottingham, the chief judge of the U.S. Court for the District of Colorado. As one commentator wrote, "Like so much that rogue judges do," their conduct is simply "inexplicable" (Cox, 2002). Maybe not. As I will explain below, new research may shed light on judicial behavioral pathology.

Analysis

Joe Losavio, a retired Colorado lawyer and former prosecutor who I recently interviewed, attested that he's aware of rumors that Judge Nottingham is or was prescribed psychotropic medications, noting "He acts like a guy off his meds." In other words, some may speculate or have reason to believe that Nottingham's behavior is the result of an untreated mental illness.

If so, should he be let off the hook that easy? After all, mental illness (as a mitigating factor) is seldom a persuasive argument before most judges. Or should we simply accept the judge's explanation that these are "private and personal matters involving human frailties and foibles"?

Conventional scholarly wisdom holds that judges on higher courts seek only to make good law, good policy, or both. In these theories, judges are externally influenced only in limited ways, in consequence of these legal and policy goals. In contrast, drawing on research in social psychology, a broad range of scholarship on judicial decision-making and an array of empirical evidence, Baum (2007) argues that that desire for popularity and respect, a motivation central to most people, is pervasively influential on judges.

Some of the behaviors, even though not immoral or criminal, are just plain bizarre. For example, the following word list was gathered from a handful of decisions of one circuit court judge, Bruce Selya. See how many can you define: algid, anent, asseverational, asthenic, chiaroscuro, decurtate, dehors, encincture, eschatocol, exigible, furculum, imbrication, imprecation, inconcinnate, integument, internuncio, isthmian, gallimaufry, longiloquent, hypoplasia, neoteric, nonce, ossature, perficient, perfrication, perlustration, perscrutation, postcibal, prescind, pruritis, purlieu, repastinate, resupination, sockdolager, solatium, struthious, vaticinate and zoetic. In none of these cases did these words appear as a result of the facts at issue (Garner, 2002, p.30). Only thirty-four percent of them were recognized by the standard dictionary that ships with Microsoft Office 2003.

In Colorado, we are blessed with another eccentric federal judicial wordsmith, Robert Blackburn. One of Blackburn's recent orders, a mere fifteen pages (double-spaced), contained the following phrases: "preternaturally vivid," "disrespectful cockalorum," "proceed insouciantly," "mordaciously sarcastic," "ingravescent remonstrations," "recusant practice," "asserted sardonically," "oleaginous comments," "concomitant synergistic effects," "courtroom milieu of contempt," "unctuous acts of affectation," "pertinacious campaign," "multifarious transgressions," and "sophomoric and puerile taunts." Of course, it was also peppered with both Latin and French phrases, including, "a fortiori," "coup de grâce," and "Gestalt." As Prendergast (2007) noted, "Contrary to the advice of great writers from Twain to Orwell, [Blackburn] never uses a familiar word where a compound obscurity will do."

Although I am no psychiatrist, I am willing to conjecture and have formed a lay opinion that a "psychological" disorder is at issue. It's called "gavelitis," a term first coined by Boot (1998) and characterized by that author this way:

This dread disease can be caused by wielding a gavel in the line of duty, and its symptoms include advanced pomposity, pathological sanctimoniousness, congenital self-importance, and aggravated eccentricity. Judges suffer from this disease grow so arrogant, so out of touch, so remote from everyday life that they think the normal rules of good behavior and human decency don't apply to them. Its not hard to understand how judges can fall prey to this malady. After all, when you wear a black robe, everyone --staff, litigants, even haughty maitre d's-- bows and scrapes and genuflects before you. All your witticisms are suddenly hilarious, all your observations astute, all your suggestions readily adopted. Your fellow man invariably addresses you as 'Your Honor' or 'Judge.' Nobody's ever mean to you and if they are, why, you can lock them up.

Boot's prose may seem tongue-in-cheek, but, as I reflect on recent reports of outrageous judicial behaviors over the last several years, I am convinced that it is a facet of the human condition. Judicial appointments seem to harbor this disorder act like a Petri dish to a bacterial or fungal culture. Consider these other accounts:

  • Jim Brooks, a judge of the Orange County California Municipal Court, ran "his" courtroom like the Jay Leno Show: Rather than holding up an "Applause" placard, he'd instead hold up an "overruled" sign in ruling on plaintiffs' objections. He tolerated and, at times, encouraged counsel to "make snide comments at will," such as narrating and singing the Rod Serling Twilight Zone intro while cross-examining a witness. Brooks had already received prior discipline for comments reflecting ethnic bias, such as, among other things, referring to Hispanic litigants as "Pedro" and issuing a bench warrant for an Asian defendant for "twenty thousand yen." The Commission on Judicial Performance noted that greater discipline was not imposed in light of the judge's agreement to retire, although, in addition to his presumed retirement benefits, he was permitted to exercise his accrued 128 days of vacation after leaving the bench.

  • A. Eugene Hammermaster, a municipal judge in Pierce County, WA, was known as "The Hammerin' Man." He had zero tolerance for people he disliked. He had been previously disciplined for trammeling the rights of low-income or unrepresented defendants. After Hammermaster completed a six-month suspension and agreed to stop threatening to impose life sentences for unpaid fines and not to hold any more trials in absentia, he was reinstated, even though he was unrepentant. He explained that everyone knew it was a joke when he told defendants they'd spend their lives in "The Crowbar Hotel" over minor fines and that it benefited defendants to hold their trials in their absence. Not long after, reports accrued of his ordering Hispanics to learn English, unwed couples to marry and those driving with suspended licenses to sell their cars. Undesirables were banished from town. One transcript shows him humiliating an unemployed mental patient. When the Judicial Discipline Commission came calling the second time, the Hammerin' Man, 67, cut a deal: He agreed to resign in return for the Commission dropping its investigation.

  • In a disciplinary proceeding against another federal judge, Samuel B. Kent, a judicial council’s report suggests several incidents of sexual harassment: "Following its initial investigation, the Special Investigatory Committee notified the judge in question of an expansion of the original complaint ... to investigate instances of alleged inappropriate behavior toward other employees of the federal judicial system and ultimately recommended that a reprimand of the judge be issued along with the accomplishment of other remedial courses of action," the council’s order said. However, other sources have told The Galvelston County Daily News that, at a party and in the offices of a law firm, a drunken Kent cornered women and grabbed them. The news outlet was also told that federal agents had been interviewing Galveston restaurateurs about who the U.S. district judge had dined and drank with throughout the years, and who has picked up the tab. Dick DeGuerin, Kent’s attorney, confirmed that the federal probe extended beyond claims of sexual misconduct: "They’re being as thorough as they can be and they’re investigating all the rumors that have been going on for years." DeGuerin admitted. "There’s always been rumors that Judge Kent favored certain lawyers or other lawyers were in disfavor with him." So far, the only discipline spelled out in a September, 2007 order was a reprimand, a four-month paid suspension and unspecified "remedial" action, which several commentators have observed amounts to a four-month paid vacation.

  • Donald Thompson, spent almost 23 years on the bench in Oklahoma. His sterling career ended after allegations surfaced that Thompson exposed himself at least 15 times during trial between 2001 and 2003. In addition to being observed shaving his genitals during at least one trial, he was caught masturbating with the aid of a "penis pump" during four trials in the same period. His former court reporter told authorities that she saw Thompson use the device almost daily during an August 2003 murder trial. A whooshing sound could be heard on the audiotape of the trial. When jurors asked the judge about the sound, Thompson said he hadn't heard it but would listen for it. Prosecutors built a case against the judge after a police officer testifying in a 2003 murder trial saw a piece of plastic tubing disappear under Thompson's robe. During a lunch break, officers took photographs of the pump under the desk. Investigators later checked the carpet, Thompson's robes and the chair behind the bench and found semen. Thompson, 59, was convicted of four felony counts of indecent exposure for the incidents that took place in his Creek County courtroom.

  • David Lanier, not unlike Judge Nottingham, was a seemingly unlikely suspect -- highly educated, influential in his community and trained in the law. However, Lanier, a state judge in Tennessee, sexually assaulted a number of women over several years, who appeared before him as litigants or who worked for him as clerks, probation officers or secretaries. Because Lanier came from a powerful family, it was difficult for local authorities to act. In fact, the District Attorney for Dyer County was Lanier's brother. Consequently, federal authorities spearheaded the investigation which culminated in 11 counts charging Lanier with various kinds of sexual assault against five women, including two instances of forced oral copulation. Between 1989 and 1991 Judge Lanier had systematically sexually assaulted the women in his chambers and in his courtroom. Many of the victims were single mothers, emotionally and economically vulnerable, who sought redress in court or courthouse jobs in an economically depressed community. Overcoming substantial reluctance to testify publicly, the victims' damaging testimony about the judge's behavior resulted in his convictions in December 1992 for conduct that ranged from willful grabbing and groping of the victims' breasts and genitalia to forced oral copulation. Before trial, he was jailed when his bail was revoked for having improperly contacted the witnesses in an effort to influence their testimony at trial. He received a prison sentence of 25 years and was fined $25,000. During the pendency of an appeal, Lanier fled to Mexico, but was soon captured by U.S. Marshals after his case was made the subject of a television episode on America's Most Wanted. The state legislature eventually removed him from office.

  • A former Michagan judge, James Scandirito, delayed sentencing a woman for driving with a suspended license in 1998. The Macomb County circuit judge invited her to lunch and told her he could help "clear some of this up." He fondled and kissed her, then continued a sexual relationship with her for two to three months. In another case the same year, Scandirito went to lunch with a woman who pleaded guilty to drunken driving, on the pretense of asking her to volunteer with Students Against Destructive Driving. He improperly touched her and told her to keep their meeting secret. In his disciplinary hearing, Scandirito presented a letter from a therapist who diagnosed him with "Impulse Control Disorder" and "Attention Deficit Disorder, Adult Residual Type." Joseph Cozzolino, chief assistant prosecutor in Macomb County, explained that he never pursued a criminal investigation because the victims did not want to press charges. Scandirito resigned from his position as judge after the state began investigating his conduct.
  • It seems that Boot was on to something right and emerging evidence appears to support his colorful characterization of gavelitis: Results of two studies (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007) disclosed in the November issue of the Journal of Applied Psychology, suggest that, when the distinction between right and wrong can be subjective, people who regard themselves as having high moral standards (i.e., said to have a "moral identity") can become the least ethical.

    "Our research suggests that a moral identity motivates behavior, but that accurate, ethical judgments are needed to set that behavior in the right direction . . . A person’s moral identity can interact with his or her judgments and actually push ethical behaviors to extreme levels."

    An earlier study (Adams & Wright, 1996), conducted for different purposes, had similar results, as the abstract reveals:

    The authors investigated the role of homosexual arousal in exclusively heterosexual men who admitted negative affect toward homosexual individuals . . . The men were exposed to sexually explicit erotic stimuli consisting of heterosexual, male homosexual, and lesbian videotapes, and changes in penile circumference were monitored. They also completed an Aggression Questionnaire . . . Both groups exhibited increases in penile circumference to the heterosexual and female homosexual videos. Only the homophobic men showed an increase in penile erection to male homosexual stimuli. The groups did not differ in aggression. Homophobia is apparently associated with homosexual arousal that the homophobic individual is either unaware of or denies.

    The Adams & Wright study reads like the line from Shakespeare's Hamlet Act 3, scene 2 ("The lady doth protest too much, me thinks"), establishing a nexus between persons who vociferously voice moral indignation towards others and the likelihood that those persons, themselves, engage in or are vulnerable to the targeted behaviors. One recent and prominent example is the Ted Haggard scandal, which hardly seems to be an isolated incident among the most outspoken of evangelical preachers.

    Additionally, further supporting the idea that propensity towards extreme behaviors may be discernable is the volume of validity research showing that integrity testing can predict behaviors, such as theft (Berry, Sackett & Wiemann, 2007). Overt integrity tests were specifically designed to predict the predisposition of job applicants to engage in on-the-job theft and other counterproductive job behavior. Commonly used tests of this type include the London House PSI, the Employee Attitude Inventory EAI, the Reid Report, the Stanton Survey, and the Trustworthiness Attitude Survey. Longitudinal studies have also demonstrated the real world impact of using integrity tests to select employees. In one study, a group of convenience stores using the PSI integrity test to select employees experienced a 50% reduction in inventory shrinkage due to theft over an 18 month period. This impact-on-losses study was replicated in a home improvement center chain. Several other studies have shown that both applicants and employees from high-theft stores scored more poorly on integrity tests than did applicants and employees from low-theft stores. In a quasi-experimental study, employees working in supermarkets that used integrity tests reported significantly less theft by their coworkers than employees working in a matched group of supermarkets that did not screen their employees using integrity tests.

    Similarly, personality-oriented measures, typically developed by psychologists, are closely linked to normal-range personality assessment devices (Shaffer & Schmidt, 1999). Considerably broader in focus, they are not explicitly aimed at theft or theft-related behaviors but, rather to predict a broad range of counterproductive behaviors using composite measures of personality dimensions, such as reliability, conscientiousness, adjustment, trustworthiness, and sociability. Commonly used tests of this variety include the California Personality Inventory, Personal Outlook Inventory, Personnel Reaction Bank, PDI Employment Inventory, and the Reliability Scale of the Hogan Personality Inventory. Personality-oriented measures have been shown to predict counterproductive behaviors in the workplace, including theft, absenteeism, tardiness, and disciplinary problems.

    Conclusion

    Lord Acton famously warned, and we have come to expect, that "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." More to the point, however, Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 78 that "there can be but few men in the society, who will have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the stations of judges. And making proper deductions for the ordinary depravity of human nature, the number must be still smaller of those, who unite the requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge."

    We cannot practically subject our incumbent federal judges to so-called "integrity tests" or "personality inventories," but I am of the opinion that the Reynolds & Ceranic study, supra, provides a practical mechanism to for attempting to gauge some judicial behavioral pathologies through an "ethical risk analysis."

    Essential to any such analysis is first appreciating the risk quotient. Risk assessment is traditionally a function of three inputs: (1) the assets in question; (2) the vulnerabilities of those assets; and (3) the known or suspected threats (Brewer, 2000).  Here, the considerable assets include the public trust, the reputation of the federal judiciary and the liberty or property interests of litigants. The threats to these assets are also considerable; are known and unknown; and include, but are not limited to: improper external influences (ex parte contact, bribery, blackmail), political loyalties, majority opinion, scandal, real or perceived favoritism, unsatisfactory appellate reversal rates, abuse of office, misuse of office, poorly managed docket, failure to discharge the duties of the office, etc. While vulnerabilities include experience, motivation, efficiencies and diligence, chief among them is the ethical fortitude (or lack thereof) of the judge, who holds the keys of stewardship to these aforesaid assets. Collectively, the vulnerabilities are both varied and significant.

    Relying, in part, on the aforementioned study results, I conclude that an ethics vulnerability assessment should consist of three metrics: (1) the statements of the subject and the ethical emphasis attached thereto (i.e., does the subject appear to express a "moral identity"); (2) the ethical import of the office (e.g., how much ethical power or influence does the office wield over others); and (3) the observable actions of the subject.

    Applying this analysis to the Nottingham situation, the results seem to fit: (1) The sentencing transcript of the Nacchio case provides overwhelming evidence of Nottingham's claim to moral superiority; (2) the lifetime appointment to the federal bench, arguably, wields the greatest ethical power, influence and judgment over others; and (3) Nottingham's alleged actions are sufficiently "extreme," as discussed in the Reynolds & Ceranic (2007) study and inapposite to the morality imposed and espoused by the Chief Judge.


    References


    Adams, H.E., Wright, L.W., & Lohr, B.A., 1996. Is Homophobia Associated with Homosexual Arousal? 105 Journal of Abnormal Psychology 3, p. 440-445.

    Baum, L. (2006). Judges and Their Audiences. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Berry, C. M., Sackett, P.R. & Wiemann, S. 2007. A review of recent developments in integrity test research. Personnel Psychology 60 (2), 271-301

    Boot, M. (1998). Arrogance, Corruption, and Incompetence on the Bench. New York: Basic Books

    Buscaglia, E., 2001. Judicial Corruption in Developing Countries: Its Causes and Economic Consequences. International Review of Law and Economics 21:2, p. 233.

    Brewer, D., Risk Assessment Models and Evolving Approaches. 2000, Gamma Secure Systems Ltd.

    Cox G.D. (2002, April 23) Injudicious Conduct: An annual look at misdeeds from the bench. The National Law Journal

    Garner, B. A. (2002). The Elements of Legal Style (2d ed.). New York: Oxford University Press

    Hamilton A., Madison J. & Jay, J., (1999). The Federalist Papers. Ed. Clinton Rossitor. New York: Mentor Books [first published in 1788]

    Posner, R.A., Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1259 (2005)

    Prendergast, P.A. (December 13, 2007). Blackburned. The Westword

    Reynolds SJ & Ceranic TL (2007). The effects of moral judgment and moral identity on moral behavior: An empirical examination of the moral individual. Journal of Applied Psychology. Nov Vol 92(6) 1610-1624

    Shaffer, D.J. & Schmidt, R.A. (1999) Personality Testing in Employment. Retrieved April 8, 2008, from http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Dec/22/130153.html

    Volcansek, M.L., (1996). Judicial Misconduct: A Cross-National Comparison. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida) Wrightsman, L.S. (1999). Judicial decision making: Is psychology relevant? New York: Plenum


    last updated:04/13/2008